If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multi-lateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian-US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8 digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.
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Introduction
The substantial increase in recent decades in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has raised concerns regarding the impact of these agreements on the implementation of multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) . 1 This has resulted in a vivid academic debate of whether PTAs are a "building block" or a "stumbling block" to MTL.
While the theoretical literature has suggested different channels through which PTAs can affect MTL, the empirical literature is still in its infancy. 2 The few empirical studies have generated contrary findings. Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) have found empirical evidence for a "stumbling block" effect of PTAs signed by the US and the EU, whereas the results in Estevadeordal et al. (2008) suggest a "building block" effect of PTAs signed in South America. Because these studies take different empirical identification strategies, it is not quite clear whether the contrary results are driven by differences in methodologies or by differences in the underlying policy environments.
Our paper provides theory-based evidence for the view that the effect of a PTA on MTL depends on the motivation for the preferential trade agreement. Employing an identification strategy similar to Karacaovali and Limão (2008) , but applying it to Canada's multilateral tariff cuts following the Canadian US free trade agreement (CUSFTA), we find empirical evidence for a building block effect of CUSFTA. We rationalize our finding by the 'exchange of market access objective' of CUSFTA. 3 Assuming that a PTA is motivated by the exchange of market access, Ornelas (2005a) has theoretically shown that a PTA will cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic import-competing industries from lobbying against the reduction of external tariffs. As a result, this so-called rent destruction effect of a PTA will free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts than in the absence of the PTA.
Our paper provides empirical evidence for a new welfare channel of the Canadian-US free trade agreement: the neutralization of inefficiencies created by lobbying activities. This welfare channel of trade agreements goes back to the seminal papers by Maggi and RodriguezClare (1998) and Mitra (2002) , but only in a two-country setting. Ornelas (2005a and 2005b) extends the Maggi-Rodriguez-Clare-Mitra rationale to discriminatory liberalization through the rent destruction effect. In this setting, the rent destruction feature of CUSFTA has two effects.
First, efficiency gains from a lower tariff against non-member countries. Second, since the leakage of protectionist benefits from lobbying is expected to reduce the amount of firm investment in wasteful lobbying, it frees funds for investment in productive capacity. The second effect complements the recent finding of Lileeva and Trefler (2010) that the Canadian-US trade agreement caused Canadian firms to invest in productivity. Our empirical findings are suggestive of a channel where some of the funds for these investments might have come from.
Our theoretical framework is embedded in the modern political economy literature of protection, which goes back to the seminal work by Hillman (1982) and Helpman (1994,1995) . This literature recognizes that government objectives are affected by campaign contributions of rent-seeking import-competing industries. Extending Grossman and Helpman (1995) by allowing a PTA to affect external tariff formation, Ornelas (2005a) identified the rent destruction effect of a PTA, resulting in a lower external tariff than in the absence of a PTA. Section 2 spells out the main features and assumptions of the underlying theoretical mechanism.
A thorny issue in the empirical literature on the effects of PTAs on MTL is the problem of reverse causality. Section 3 reviews the main features of CUSFTA and argues that it provides a clearly defined policy experiment with the exchange of market access being the prime motive for the agreement. Specifically, policy decisions regarding CUSFTA can be viewed as reasonably exogenous to policy decisions regarding tariff settings during the Uruguay Round.
Causal inference pertaining to the effect of a preferential arrangement (FTA in the present context) on the determination of external tariffs needs to involve some counterfactual reasoning. Since external tariff negotiations are never observed in the presence and the absence of an FTA, we use tariff changes on non-FTA goods as the counterfactual for tariff changes in the absence of an FTA. 4 The identification stems from 8-digit variation in tariff changes in non-FTA goods versus FTA goods, where FTA goods are the subset of goods that a country imports under its FTA. Section 4 of our paper applies this methodology to examine the impact of CUSFTA on Canada's multi-lateral tariff cuts during the Uruguay Round. Using a variety of specifications we find that Canadian preferences under CUSFTA had a statistically and economically significant effect on Canada's tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round. More 4 To best of our knowledge, this identification strategy was first suggested by Limão (2006) . ambitious tariff cuts of on average 2.2 percentage points on FTA goods relative to non-FTA goods provide strong evidence for Ornelas's (2005a) rent destruction effect.
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Our findings are compatible with previous research which provides evidence for preferences promoting external tariff liberalization in Latin America and Asia (cf. Bohara et al., 2004; Estevadeordal et al., 2008; and Calvo-Pardo et al., 2010) . Our results are, however, in contrast to Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) who find the opposite when focusing on the US and the EU. While Karacaovali and Limão (2008) consider a theoretical framework in which a home country grants tariff preferences towards a smaller trading partner in exchange for cooperation agreements in non-trade areas (e.g. environment, immigration, drug trafficking, etc.) -which is the case for a substantial number of PTAs concluded by the US and the EU, our results are based on a PTA-framework of reciprocal market-access with a large and highly developed trading partner. 6 Given the use of a common empirical methodology, the differences in results indicate that it is important to recognise the differences in PTA-settings when analysing the impact of trade preferences on multilateral tariff cuts.
Analytical Framework
Our conceptual framework is based on Ornelas (2005a) who showed that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) can cause leakage of protectionist benefits to import competing industries which may moderate the role of political economy forces and ultimately lead to lower external tariffs than in the absence of an FTA. In what follows we sketch the main features of the model focusing on the key assumptions, underlying mechanism and prediction as relevant to our empirical implementation and refer the interested reader to Ornelas (2005a) for a detailed discussion of the underlying theory. Although Ornelas (2005a) is cast in a specific-factor model, the rent-destruction effect has shown to hold assuming an oligopolistic market structure (Ornelas 2005b) or assuming that countries cooperate multilaterally (Ornelas, 2008) . This 5 It is worthwhile noticing that Trefler (2004) finds also significant short-term adjustment costs for the Canadian economy but long-run gains following the formation CUSFTA. Both aspects tend to support Ornelas's (2005) rent destruction argument as well as his conclusions regarding the political viability of (only) welfare improving FTAs (cf. Ornelas, 2005a) . 6 Both, the EU and the US, have formed numerous trade agreements with smaller trading partners which all include cooperation requirements in certain areas such as intellectual property enforcement, democracy, human rights, labour standards or deeper integration issues. Examples for the EU include the MED, GSP and ACP, preferential trading schemes, whereas PTAs with Andean (ATPA), Caribbean (CBI) and GSP countries may be cited for the US. Canada, however, differs from the latter PTA-setting in the sense that it formed a fully-fledged mutual market-access based FTA with a much larger and highly developed economy-i.e. the US. We argue that a PTA-setting in which substantial market access has been granted to a much larger developed trading partner may give rise to a rent destruction effect and thus more aggressive external tariff liberalisation.
theoretical generality provides further motivation to link the prediction to the data.
Consider a three country, N-sector competitive economy framework that focuses on the external tariff formation of Home against the Rest of the World (ROW) in the presence and absence of Home forming an FTA with a foreign economy (Foreign). The analytics is greatly simplified by assuming that each country is the natural importer of a distinct subset of goods and that tariffs are the only instruments of protection. A key feature of this model is that
Home's external tariffs against imports from ROW are endogenous to Home forming an FTA with Foreign.
To understand the mechanism through which an FTA affects Home's equilibrium external tariff, we first lay out the political economy structure of tariff formation. Following Helpman (1994, 1995) , Home's political objective is to maximize a weighted average of national welfare and campaign contributions from producers in import competing sectors. Assuming both symmetry across sectors and the overcoming of free-rider problems among producers within a sector, the net payoff V of a representative import-competing sector is the difference between aggregate profit П and campaign contributions T to the home government. The incentive for the industry paying campaign contributions stems from the protectionist benefit of a higher external tariff t, captured by dП(t)/dt>0. Hence:
Home's political objective function G is national welfare W, defined as the sum of producers' surplus, consumers' surplus and tariff revenue, plus the weighted sum of campaign contributions:
where b (>0) is a parameter capturing the government's political bias.
Following Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1988] , the equilibrium external tariff, which we denote as the political tariff t p , is the outcome of a bargaining process between the government and the domestic import-competing industry. Since this political tariff maximizes the joint payoff function, W(t)+bП(t), it is given by:
If there is no political bias in tariff formation, i.e. b=0, the government will set an optimal tariff t * which maximizes social welfare W. The deviation of the political tariff t p from the optimal t * stems from the weight put on producers' profits.
Consider now the effect of an FTA with Foreign on Home's political equilibrium. The formation of the FTA will eliminate all trade barriers between Home and Foreign, while allowing Home and Foreign to maintain their external tariffs independently. One of the key channels of the FTA is that it reduces the sensitivity of domestic profits to changes in the external tariff, which is captured by:
where П FTA denotes the industry's domestic profits in the presence of an FTA. The intuition behind (4) is that the market access granted to foreign producers leads to an increase in competition and a corresponding decrease in the market share of the domestic industry at any given external tariff. Hence, a tariff-induced increase in the domestic price of the import competing sector has a smaller effect on domestic profits compared to a world without the FTA.
This rent destruction feature of an FTA will diminish the political economy forces in the determination of Home's external equilibrium tariff. Lower domestic industry profits will reduce the industry's protectionist benefit from lobbying which will imply a reduction of campaign contributions. On the other hand, lower campaign contributions will diminish the role of the 'political component' in the government's objective function (2), allowing the determination of a tariff closer to the social optimum.
Denoting the optimal political tariff in the presence of an FTA with t P FTA and the corresponding welfare maximizing tariff with t * FTA, we obtain our main theoretical relationship:
The formation of a market-access based FTA reduces the level of politically determined external tariffs thereby reducing the spread between political and socially optimal tariffs.
Assuming that the empirically unobservable optimal tariff is not affected by the FTA, i.e. t * ≈ t* FTA , we obtain the prediction which we will bring to the data:
where ∆t P FTA = t P FTA -t* FTA and ∆t P = t P -t*. Inequality (6) predicts that one should observe higher multi-lateral tariff cuts in the presence of a market access based FTA than in its absence, ceteris paribus. By construction, the derivation of (6) assumed that the formation of the FTA was exogenous to the determination of external tariffs. In the next section we will argue that the nature of the Canadian-US Free trade (CUSFTA) agreement provides a natural testing environment for (6) in light of Canada's tariff adjustments during the Uruguay Round.
CUSFTA and Uruguay Round Tariff Reductions
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)
The Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1988 and entered into force on January 1, 1989. 7 Representing a clearly defined natural policy experiment, CUSFTA obliged policy makers to eliminate tariffs on all products over up to ten years. The agreement led to increasing trade flows between the two contracting parties, in particular in those products experiencing the largest tariff cuts (Clausing, 2001 (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001; Trefler, 2004) .
Combined with the fact that the Canadian government committed itself to, sooner or later, eliminate tariffs on all manufacturing goods, suggests that the decision to cut bilateral tariff against the U.S. was largely 'exogenous'. 12 8 Article 401 (part 2; chapter 4) of the Canadian United States Free Trade Agreement specifies that all tariffs will be withdrawn according to three different reduction schemes by January 1, 1998. While the first reduction scheme immediately eliminated all tariffs for a series of industries as of January 1989, reduction schemes number two and three focused on a step-wise phasing-in of the reductions over five and ten years, respectively. Moreover, CUSFTA also included duty free trade provisions of automotive products as of January 1, 1998. 9 The latter has been graphically demonstrated by Trefler (2004 Gaston and Trefler (1997) , as well as Trefler (2004) , conduct a series of statistical endogeneity tests and fail to find evidence for the latter.
Uruguay Round Tariff Concessions
Reducing and 'binding' multilateral (i.e. mfn) tariffs in order to secure and enhance market access for all GATT-contracting parties were the leading themes of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations. The precise reduction modalities of tariff rates were subject to preliminary negotiations among all the GATT-contracting parties. While Canada strongly favoured a formula-based tariff reduction technique, similar to the 'Swiss formula' applied in the previous (i.e. Tokyo) multilateral trade round, the United States fiercely rejected such a procedural method emphasising that it would only engage in item-by-item trade talks (Stewart, 1999; Laird, 1999) . 13 Giving more leeway to a potential sorting by sensitive and less sensitive products, the negotiating parties finally agreed on a request and offer approach without preventing countries to apply reduction formulas on their own (offered) tariff cuts (Stewart, 1999; Laird, 1999) . 14 The UR participants, further, agreed to reduce tariffs "with a target amount of overall reductions at least as ambitious as that achieved by the [Swiss-] formula in the Tokyo Round" (Hoda, 2001:35) , a statement that was generally interpreted as an overall tariff reduction aim of 33.3% (Hoda, 2001; Laird, 1999) .
15 Table 1 summarises Canada's bound ad-valorem mfn tariff rates agreed upon during the Uruguay Round by industry. While the wearing apparel industry shows the largest average MFN tariff protection before and after the Uruguay Round, (with rates of 24 and 17 percent, respectively), the footwear and textile industries are close followers with 22 and 18 percent average protection before, and 17 and 12 percent (respectively) after the Uruguay Round. The lowest average mfn tariff rates before the UR appear in beverages (5 percent) and the wood, paper and non-ferrous metals industries (all 8 percent), while the paper, printing (both duty free) and iron and steel (one percent) sectors were least protected after the UR. In terms of percentage point reductions, printing as well as the iron and steel industries (10 and 8 percentage points, respectively) had the largest average MFN cuts. Beverage and wood products benefited from relatively low average trade barrier reductions (i.e. 2 and 3 percentage points, respectively). Finally, it is also worth noting that the inter-industry variations are 13 Apart from Canada, the EU and Japan also favoured a formula based reduction approach (Stewart, 1999; Laird, 1999) . 14 Annex Figure 1 provides a graphical analysis of the relationship between initial and final bound rates and tends to confirm that Canada's initially higher (bound) mfn tariff rates were reduced more in the UR, as indicated by the increasing gap between the 45 degree reference line and the two linear regression lines. There is, however, also some indication of the so-called sectoral agreements. In these sectors many tariff lines were reduced to a common (including zero) rate pointing to an alternative reduction approach. 15 The U.S. implemented the item-by-item request and offer approach by submitting extensive lists of tariff reduction requests to their main trading partners in October 1989 (Laird, 1999) .
complemented by considerable intra-industry variations, as illustrated by the coefficients of variation (see Table 1 , Column (4)). 
Empirical Implementation
Econometric specification
The theoretical prediction (6) implies larger external tariff cuts in the presence than in the absence of a market-access based preferential trade agreement. In the previous section we have established that CUSFTA provides a fitting policy experiment to examine the impact of CUSFTA on Canada's external tariff cuts during the Uruguay Round. Since it is not possible to observe Canada's external tariff cuts in the absence of CUSFTA, we follow Limão's (2006) identification strategy and use tariff changes on non-FTA goods as the counterfactual for tariff changes in the absence of FTA goods. Contrasting political tariff adjustments in the presence and in the absence of an FTA, equation (6) implies larger external tariff cuts on products imported with preferential market access relative to products not imported under such preferences, ceteris paribus.
Our objective is to estimate the impact of CUSFTA preferences on Canadian multilateral tariff cuts at the product level. The econometric specification is given by
The dependent variable Δt i represents the change of the bound MFN tariff negotiated during the Uruguay Round. The analysis is conducted at the 8-digit HS product level and encompasses a sample of 3138 observations. Our sample excludes agricultural products because of the heavy incidence of non-tariff measures in that sector. Product lines with initial zero MFN tariffs are also excluded due to the impossibility to grant tariff preferences on these items.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the indicator variable i I which takes the value 1 if product i was granted a specific preferential tariff concession and has also been imported from the US, otherwise it is zero. Canadian tariff preferences, in place at the time of the UR, had been granted under several preferential trading schemes including the General Preferential Tariff (GPT), the Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreements (CARIBCAN) as well as the Canadian-U.S. and later the North American Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA/NAFTA), the latter two representing the focus of our analysis. We further introduce additional measures for preferential market access using the share of imports originating from North-American trading partners as well as the latter's interaction with the CUSFTA FTA-good indicator ( i I ).
The impact of the latter two measures on negotiated multilateral tariff reductions may provide additional information regarding the magnitude of tariff cuts relative to the amount of preferential imports. The main theoretical prediction is that the coefficient of i I is positive and the size of the coefficient captures the magnitude of the building bloc effect of CUSFTA.
The remaining variables in (7) are controls that capture aspects of tariff adjustments which are not captured by the theoretical mechanism and which have been suggested by previous studies in the literature. The variable R i captures the extent to which Canada lowered its external tariffs in good i to reciprocate tariff reductions of its trading partners.
Representing an important element in WTO negotiations, we account for the latter by Finger et al. (2002) , where w i k denotes product i's share in total imports of country k and ∆t i k /t i k represents k's tariff cuts in product i. Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that reciprocal tariff reductions do not necessarily refer to the same matching set of products. In practise it is more common to reciprocate with tariff reductions on other products which are possibly more important for the partner country. Some authors therefore distinguish between products j and products i, where j denotes products subject to tariff reductions in partner country k, and i to products subject to mfn tariff cuts by the Home country. For simplicity, however, we use the product index i for both trading partners. 17 Note that information on Canada's direct negotiating partners during the UR is not publicly available. 18 GATT regulations denote a country as the 'principal supplier' when the latter accounts for the largest share of GATT imports in a specific product of another country. Country k's export share of product i to Canada (s it k ) indentifies Canada's 'principal suppliers' for each good i. 19 The MFN externality effect becomes more obvious when we consider a scenario in which there is only one exporter of a certain product to Canada, which would then be the only beneficiary of Canada's tariff reductions on a certain product. 13 therefore translate into smaller Canadian tariff cuts since the latter's government cannot expect extensive reciprocal reductions in return and, therefore, may have a lower incentive to liberalize itself. Given the lack of information on Canada's direct negotiating partners, we capture this effect by constructing a measure based on the share of Canada's non top-5 (i.e. smaller) trading partners per product line i. A significant variation in the latter ratio between 1994 and 1988 may reflect a change in the number of non top-5 exporting countries between the two last successfully concluded trade rounds and thus serve as a proxy measure of an mfn externality effect. 20 We define P i as an indicator variable taking the value one if the latter mentioned change is larger than the median change and zero otherwise. denotes the change in the inverse import penetration ratio between 1992 (final phase UR) and 1978 (end TR) and I ε reflects the import demand elasticity in the respective ISIC 3-digit industry. Finally, given that larger mfn tariff reductions may be easier to implement on products where pre-UR tariffs were already relatively high and in light of significant differences in average pre-UR tariffs in our sample, we also introduce initial (i.e.
pre-UR) tariff rates ( 1
Data
All variables introduced in the model are listed and defined in Annex Reciprocal tariff reductions have been constructed by using import weighted UR tariff cuts from Finger et al. (2002) , who construct an aggregate measure of the participating countries' bound tariff concessions. Using the latter information we combine country level aggregated average concessions with supplier-specific 8-digit HS Canadian import shares using data from the UN-Trains database.
In order to proxy political economy forces we calculate elasticity-weighted inverse import penetration ratios at an ISIC 3-digit industry level. Sector-level import and production data, used to construct the latter ratios, are retrieved from the UN-COMTRADE and UNIDO databases respectively, while the industry-level import demand elasticities are from Kee et al.
(2009). Industry-level (i.e. ISIC 3-digit) data on value added and on the number of establishments, employed to construct instruments for the political economy variable, are also from the UNIDO database. In order to take into account different aggregation levels of our independent variables we use clustering of standard errors at the sector level.
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Estimation and Empirical Findings
Establishing a causal relationship between tariff preferences and multilateral tariff changes is often considered a major challenge. Given that tariff preferences are more valuable the higher the external tariff protection, the level of the MFN tariffs themselves may determine whether a product receives a preference. Smaller expected MFN tariff reduction for certain products may, therefore, strongly enhance a partner country's desire for preferential market access. In light of the overriding influence of CUSFTA preferences for Canada and the presumably greater importance of preferential market access for Canada to the US market than vice-versa, we, however, expect possible endogeneity concerns to be less of an issue. Our preferred empirical specification is therefore based on a non-instrumental OLS regression approach.
Additional D is therefore introduced as an instrument since the latter is unlikely to be correlated with the error term, again due to the timing of the agreed MFN tariff rate changes. 24 Countries are also more likely to ask for preferences on goods which they suspect to be subject to NTBs in the future -as a proxy for future NTBs 22 World price changes at the 8-digit HS product-level are proxied by calculating unit-values using import value and quantity information available at UN-TRAINS. 23 Given a fixed amount of exports X i S , a country's benefit from a preference for product i can be written as (t i mfnt i pref )*p i w X i S . The latter expression indicates that the higher world prices, the higher the benefit arising from a preference. Increasing world prices may therefore help PTA partner countries to overcome fixed export costs, which could make them more likely to export. Furthermore, the inclusion of unit-values as an instrument reduces our sample from 4742 to 3138 observations. Estimating OLS and IV-GMM with the larger sample (i.e. without unit-values) results in qualitatively identical findings. The latter results are available upon request. 24 Using a partner-specific import dummy Potential reverse causality problems may also arise from the reciprocity variable. By taking advantage of the timing and mode of the Uruguay Round, we employ an instrumental variable capturing the unilateral external tariff reductions independently undertaken between 1986 and 1992. In light of serious doubts regarding the successful conclusion of the UR before 1992 (Stewart, 1999; Finger et al., 2002) and given that previously undertaken unilateral tariff reductions were later, between 1992 and 1994 -when the final tariff rates were negotiated, explicitly reciprocated, unilateral tariff changes serve as a valid instrument. 26 Finally, given that the political economy variable (defined as the change in the elasticity weighed inverse import penetration ratio between 1978 and 1992) is in all its elements strongly dependent on domestic prices and hence MFN tariff rates, reverse causality issues may also emerge from this variable too. Given that political economy forces may display some persistency over time using lagged values may not fully take into account possible endogeneity issues. The introduction of the change in scale economies (valued added/number of firms) at an ISIC 3-digit level between 1981 and 1992 and the latter's interaction with world prices is based on the intuition that industries with higher fixed entry costs are likely to have a higher inverse import penetration ratio (i.e. X I /M I ) and that world prices directly impact on domestic prices which in return determine X I , M I and ε I . Table 2 reports the estimations of equation (7) ) with the import dummy variable (D i 94 ) and introduce the combined component as an additional instrumental variable. The intuition is that a country would even be more inclined to ask for a preference if Canada already imported the latter product, which could be subjected to a future NTB. 26 Finger et al. (2002:121) note that "according to delegations, the informal practice was more or less to count from applied rates in 1986 to the bound rate agreed at the Uruguay Round. By this practice, countries that had, after 1986, unilaterally reduced their tariffs would be given 'credit' at the round to the extent that they bound these cuts at the round." Moreover, Limão (2006) points out that the data shows that all counties engaged in some unilateral tariff reductions. 27 In order to take into account potential misclassifications at such detailed levels of product disaggregation we consider a product to be exported to Canada if the latter's trade value is above a certain (low) threshold. In our estimations we Analysing the results of different econometric specifications shows that OLS as well as IV estimates both report coefficients of -0.022 (Regressions (1) and (5), respectively), for Canadian preferences granted under CUSFTA indicating that bound MFN tariff reductions of preferentially imported goods were on average between 2.2 percentage points larger than on goods imported under the mfn tariff. 28 Moreover, average tariff reductions of around 3.6
percentage points for non-FTA goods tend to highlight the economic importance of the determined 'building block' effect.
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Using the share of Canadian U.S. imports at the end of the Uruguay Round (i.e. six years after the implementation of CUSFTA) as an additional measure for preferential market access tends to confirm the latter findings (Regressions (3) and (7)). Coefficients of -0.011 and -0.014 for the OLS and IV estimations, respectively, point to larger tariff cuts on products which were predominantly imported by the US providing suggestive evidence for more aggressive tariff reductions in industries where rents had to be shared (i.e. 'leakage' effect).
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The above findings are confirmed when NAFTA preferences are taken into account.
With coefficients of -0.022 for the NAFTA preference good specifications (Regressions (2) and (6)), and again of 0.011 and 0.014 for the U.S. import share variables (Regressions (3), (4) and (7), (8) variable. The 'MFN externality effect' (β 3 ) has in all specifications the expected sign and is apply a threshold of 1,000 USD (the lowest value recorded in UN-Trains). Using no threshold or thresholds of 2, 3 or 5 thousand USD results in qualitatively identical findings. The results are available upon request. 28 The average tariff reduction across all product lines amounts to 6 percentage points (see Annex Table 2 ). 29 It is interesting to note that Karacaovali and Limão (2008) find a 'stumbling block' of 1.5 percentage points in their main IV specification. Against the backdrop of an almost identical average mfn tariff reduction for non-PTA goods in the latter authors' sample (i.e. 3.4 percentage points), the economic magnitude of the, for Canada determined, 'building block' effect seems to be much larger. 30 Interacting the U.S. import share with the CUSFTA preference indicator variable (used in regressions (1) and (5)) results in qualitatively similar results. The latter estimations are available upon request.
18 also highly significant (i.e. at the 1% level). Estimates between 0.008 and 0.011 point to larger Canadian tariff reductions when the number of non top-5 suppliers, and hence potentially free-riding countries, declined by a significant amount between 1988 and 1994.
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The significant free-riding results may also capture some reciprocity aspects, since a smaller number of potentially free-riding countries provides an enhanced incentive for more meaningful reciprocal tariff reductions. The highly significant MFN externality coefficient in the IV-regressions for the CUSFTA-and NAFTA FTA good specifications may, therefore, partially explain the insignificance of the reciprocity variable in the IV-GMM estimations. Finally, initial (i.e. pre-UR) tariff rates seem to be an important determinant in all specifications. Negative coefficients of between -0.302 and -0.242 tend to point to larger tariff reductions of initially high mfn rates. Given that, on average, pre-UR mfn tariffs display considerable differences when comparing FTA and non-FTA goods, this seems to be an important control variable. For the CUSFTA and NAFTA-good specifications, pre-UR tariffs tend to be markedly higher than their non-FTA good counterparts, leading to the possibility that the 'building block' effect may be driven by larger reductions for higher initial MFN rates when not controlling for the latter. 32 The inclusion of the pre-UR rates may, as a result, also account for the potential use of an implicit reduction formula in the UR negotiations by Canadian negotiators.
The test statistics in Table 2 show that the estimates are reasonably robust. Using 'Hansen's J'-tests to test the excluded instruments' joint significance, we find that the second-stage error terms are uncorrelated with the latter instruments. This is also illustrated by the strong acceptance of the null hypothesis stating an overall good instrument quality.
33
In light of a relative large number of instruments 'Hansen J'-tests may lose some of their explanatory power. We follow Karacaovali and Limão (2008) in testing the subgroup of, a priori more endogeneity-prone, instruments (i.e. the NTB and import dummy variables) for orthogonality to the error term. The displayed difference-in-Sargan statistics (C-stats.) reject in all model specifications the null of correlation with the error term for the smaller subset of instruments. 34 In order to test the OLS estimates for inconsistency, Table 2 also reports the results for the standard Hausman tests. The displayed test probabilities for the IV-GMM regressions tend to show no concern for an inconsistency of the OLS estimates at a 5 percent 31 The 'mfn externality' effect is also significant in the specifications including the Canadian U.S. import share, however, only when estimated with OLS. 32 The pre-UR average bound tariff levels for the CUSFTA-and NAFTA-good specifications both amount to 12.79 percentage points, whereas the respective non-CUSFTA and non-NAFTA good counterparts are 11.91 and 11.87 percentage points, respectively. 33 The latter is underscored by a strong rejection of the F-tests in the first stage regressions. 34 The subset of tested instruments includes all instruments constructed by using the variables D i ntb93 or D i 94 (see Annex  Table 1 ). Table 2 , therefore, only provide very weak evidence for the existence of an endogeneity-bias of the OLS estimates. Notes. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate the OLS regression results when using a CUSFTA preference indicator variable. Columns (3) and (4) present the regression results focusing on the product-level US import share. Regressions (5)- (8) represent the IV-GMM results for the latter specifications. Regressions (7) and (8) use partner-country specific import dummies D i j 94 instead of D i 94 as an instrument. All regressions are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustering at the 3-digit ISIC industry level. *, **, *** illustrate the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. For the IV-GMM estimations, the instruments exclusion F-tests of the first-stage regression are all rejected either at the 1 or 5 percent threshold level with F-statistics that are considerably larger than 10 for I i and R i . For ∆X I the latter statistic assumes values at around 4. The first-stage regression results are available upon request. (a) Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis all instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage regression and correctly excluded from the estimated equation (i.e. the instruments are valid instruments). (b) C-statistic (or Difference-in-Sargan statistic) allows for testing the exogeneity of one or a subset of instruments. The null hypothesis states that the tested instruments are exogenous. The subset of tested instruments is: D i 94, Dntball, Dntball*D i 94, Dntb, (∆p9294)avg*∆scale. The Cstatistic is defined as the difference of the Sargan-Hansen value of the equation with the restricted (i.e. omitted questionable instruments and, therefore, also smaller) set of instruments and the equation with the unrestricted (i.e. full and larger) set of instruments (i.e. C-stat = Jr -Ju). (c) Endogeneity test for the potentially endogenous regressors marked with ‡. The null hypothesis says that the marked endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous (i.e. OLS estimation is consistent and efficient). The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested and is defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen values (cf. above). (d) Pagan and Hall's test of heteroskedasticity for estimations using instrumental variables (IV). The null hypothesis is that no heteroskedasticity is present.
significance level. Test statistics reported in
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Robustness analysis
We conduct a series of robustness exercises. A summary of the findings from these are in Table 3 , the first column reporting the estimated coefficient on the preference good indicator (I i ) from Table 2 (columns 1 and 5) with the estimated coefficients on the other variables suppressed. The other columns, in Table 3 , record the estimated coefficient on I i for the alternative specifications (with the other variables in the regression suppressed, but available on request). The results for the OLS estimations are illustrated in the first row of Table 3 , whereas the second row presents the outcome for the IV-GMM specifications.
We first introduce an additional indicator variable at the HS 1-digit level to test whether our 'building block' effect still holds when accounting for unobserved industry effects defined according to the Harmonized System (HS). Column (2) shows that the inclusion of the additional indicator results in the same findings as in the baseline specification when estimating with OLS and a still highly significant (albeit slightly smaller in absolute terms) coefficient of -0.020 when estimating with IV-GMM.
Furthermore, we show that the finding of a 'building block' effect holds if we exclude the product lines affected by the zero-for-zero sectoral negotiations (column 3) and these product lines plus chemicals (column 4). Accounting for sectoral agreements tests whether the 'building block' results may be driven by an alternative tariff reduction rationale. 35 We also exclude the reciprocity variable and its instrument from our regressions.
Column (5) shows that the exclusion of the reciprocity variable results in almost the same findings as in the baseline specification. Karacaovali and Limão (2008) argue that products affected by NTBs towards all trading partners may be characterized by additional common unobserved features which in return may also influence MFN tariff reductions. Although, testing the subset of instruments involving the NTB variable for orthogonality to the error term rejects this possibility, we explicitly drop all instruments including the latter indicator variable. The results are reported in column (6). The findings show a persistent 'building block' effect of -0.021 for the IV regressions, compared to the baseline specification, in column (1), a slightly smaller but still highly significant, 'building block' effect.
Finally, we check that what we are treating as a CUSFTA tariff preference effect is only due to CUSFTA. Some of the FTA goods under CUSFTA (3011 goods) are also goods that are preferentially treated under Canada's various other preferential trading schemes. If we exclude those goods from the set of FTA goods to identify goods that are CUSFTA only preferential goods, we are left with 1713 goods. In column (7) we report on the estimated coefficient on the preference good indicator (I i ) for this narrower set of CUSFTA-only preferences. Again we find that the estimated coefficient is negative and significant (at a 10% level for OLS and 1% for the IV estimation).
For all of the robustness exercises above 'Hansen's-J' statistics strongly reject the null of a correlation between the instruments and the second-stage error terms. 36 Testing the subgroup of, a priori more endogeneity-prone, instruments for a potential correlation to the second-stage error term, also strongly rejects the null of non-orthogonality to the error term, as illustrated by the Difference-in-Sargan statistic p-values which are larger than 0.17 for all regressions. Notes: Column (1) displays the baseline regression results reported in Table 2 (Column (1)). In all regression concordance tables have been used. Column (2)-(6) illustrate the regression results derived when subjecting the baseline findings, displayed in Column (1), to various robustness tests. Tariff lines covered by so-called sectoral agreements including the 'zero-for-zero' concessions have been excluded in Columns (3) and (4). Information on the product coverage of sectoral agreements is limited to the information provided by the WTO secretariat (WTO, 2005) . The baseline results have also been tested to the exclusion of individual industries. The latter results confirm the 'building block' findings and are available upon request. All regressions use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the 3-digit ISIC industry level. *, **, *** illustrate the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Conclusions
In this paper we examine the impact of tariff preferences on UR multilateral tariff cuts by Canada. While other studies have investigated the effect of preferences given by industrial countries to developing countries, we extend the literature by analysing the effect of trade preferences on the mfn tariff reductions of an industrial country with preferences that include comprehensive preferential trade preferences for a much larger, industrial trade partner. In the present setting we anticipate the exchange of market access to be an important consideration in the setting up of the preferences, and to be much greater scope for a rent destruction effect than where offering preferences to smaller, developing countries. With greater rent destruction from the FTA, we expect there to be reduced political economy resistance to multilateral liberalisation.
Contrary to earlier studies which find evidence for a 'stumbling block' caused by US and EU granted preferences (cf. Limão, 2006; Karacaovali and Limão, 2008) , we find a 'building block' effect of Canadian preferences on multilateral tariff reductions agreed upon during the Uruguay Round. Our results show that preferentially imported products were subjected to (bound) MFN tariff reductions which were on average 2.2 percentage points larger than those for non-preferentially imported products.
The identified 'building-block' effect of Canadian preferences is in line with some other findings that preferences act as a catalyst for multilateral tariff cuts (cf. Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti, 2004; Estevadeoral, Freund and Ornelas, 2010; Calvo-Pardo et al. 2010) . These studies use an alternative empirical methodology to the present study. But our findings stand in stark contrast to Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) , who, using the same methodology as that used here, provide empirical support for the existence of a 'stumbling block' for the US and EU. The contrast in findings cannot therefore be accounted for by differences in the empirical method. It must rather be because of differences in context and influences on the decision-making process. The findings for the US and the EU have been rationalised in the context of a theoretical framework in which smaller trading partners reciprocate tariff preferences with cooperation agreements in non-trade issues. We argue in the present context that PTAs based on mutual market access concessions, may lead to increased intra-bloc competition and a destruction of political rents which in turn facilitate mfn tariff cuts following the formation of a PTA (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999; Ornelas, 2005a) .
In contrast to the US and the EU, both of which have a substantial number of PTAs with smaller countries, Canada's most important PTA involves predominately preferential market 24 access granted to a much larger economy -the US. The over-riding influence of market access-based preferences in this case can be expected to have reduced internal Canadian protectionist forces and induced our 'building block' finding for Canada in the Uruguay Round.
Our finding is consistent with the empirical evidence found for mfn tariff changes in the context of South-South preferential trade agreements, which would also appear to be based on mutual market access concessions Calvo-Pardo et al., 2010) . The nature of the PTA formed -i.e. whether it is primarily based on market access concessions or on cooperation in non-trade issues -, as well as the relative competitiveness (i.e. size) of the preferential trading partner(s) are decisive elements in determining the impact of preferences on multilateral tariff cuts.
Annex
Annex (1), (2), (3) and (4) are based on 6936, 7118, 7678 and 6670 observations, respectively. Column (5) refers to 4607 observations, while the statistics in Columns (6) and (7) are based on 3891 observations each. The number of observations included is based on data availability (UN-Trains). Columns denoted with 'mean' present the simple mean average over all 8-digit HS product lines pertaining to the respective industry.
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Annex Unilateral tariff reductions R i uni Reciprocity measurement as described above but this time focusing on import-weighed unilateral tariff reductions of UR participants undertaken between 1986 and 1992 only (instrumental variable for R i ). Notes: (a) The change in the elasticity weighed inverse import penetration ratio ∆XI is calculated as x 92 -x 78 . (b) The change in the MFN externality effect or the change in the share of small (non-top5 exporters) of product-line i to Canada is calculated as share 94 -share 89 . (c) The variables are based on the authors' own calculations and the following data sources: WTO, TRAINS, COMEXT, UNIDO, as well as Finger et al. (2002) and Kee et al. (2009). 29 Annex Note: The graph illustrates the pre-and post UR (bound) MFN ad-alorem tariff rates and is based on our sample of 3138 observations. The dased 45°line illustrates a hypothetical line of no tariff changes. The dashed linear regression line (1) is based on the whole sample, whereas the solid linear regession line excludes products covered by 'zero-for-zero' concessions and thus by a different reduction rationale. Source: WTO schedule of concessions and authors' own calculations.
